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Summary findings
Min and Park explore how Korea's financial structure  others'  diminish, suggesting that monetary policies
affects the volatility of asset prices. Documented  should target different  asset markets to achieve different
empirical evidence of the relationship between financial  goals. If the goal of the monetary authority is to stabilize
structure and financial crisis sheds light on the  the money market rate, for example, intervening in the
relationship between asset price volatility - extreme  banking sector is more efficient than intervening in other
variations in prices - and financial structure. And the  financial subsectors.
volatility of financial and nonfinancial asset prices  *  The higher volatility of stock prices reflects the thin
provides an indirect link between an economy's financial  stock market in Korea.
structure and the likelihood of financial crisis.  *  The stability of the yield on government housing
Using time-series data and a set of indicators  bonds reflects the Korean government's  policy of
measuring financial structure, Min and Park examine  stabilizing the nation's housing supply by isolating the
how Korea's financial structure affects the volatility of  housing market from the impact of Korea's financial
the real effective exchange rate, the money market rate,  structure.
government bond yields, and stock prices. They find:  *  Restrictions on foreigners' ownership  cf domestic
* There is a stable long-term relationship between  stock in Korea during the period analyzed, and the fact
financial structure and volatility in the real effective  that most capital flows through commercial banks, affect
exchange rate, the money market rate, stock prices, and  the exchange rate, which is determined (at least in the
the yield on government housing bonds.  short run) by capital flows in the foreign exchange
l  Financial structure affects asset price variables  market.
asymmetrically. Some variables' volatility increases and
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The literature on currency crises has provided a nurmber  of suggestions about the
possib:le  influence of financial structure on tne volatility of asset prices and capital flows.
There  is  by  now  a  documented empiricai  evidence  of  the  relationship  between  the
financial structure and  financial crisis.  While  this  inay  provide  some indirect insight
about the  relationship between  asset  volatility  - interpreted  as  extreme variations  of
prices - and financial structure, a more direct analys:is seems to be missing.  Although
finance theory tells us that the linkage between the financial structure of the economy and
the  likelihood  of  financial crises  is  provided  by  the volatility  of  financial  and  non-
financial asset prices, this intermediate link is still somewhat unexplored.  Stock prices
often cdouble  or fall in half in a space of a few years, when there seems to be no concrete
reason  why stock  prices  shouid  have changed  at  all.  Sometimes  speculative prices
change dramatically in a matter of days or even hours.  On  19 October 1987, the day of
the worst crash in U.S. stock market history, the Dowv  Jones Industrial Average lost  16
percent of its value in the space of three hours, from  1  .15 p.m. to 4.00 p.m.  Analyses of
news  service records  show  that  during  that  intervel  of  time  there  was  virtually  no
econoimic news except  for the news of the stock market  drop itself.  Such evidence
would seem to  suggest that the source of market vo]atility is something loosely called
"market psychology,'  the charnging  public expectations, attitudes, and theories about the
market (Shiller, 1992').
In this paper, we examine how the financial structure of  an economy,  Korea,
affects the asset price volatility of several key financial variables using time-series data.
To  measure  empirically  the  financial structure  of  a  counitry we  employ the  recently
developed  concept  of  bank-based versus  market-based financial  structure  (Demirguc-
1Kunt and Levine, 1999).  In section II, we describe the development of Korea's financial
structure.  In section HI, we investigate the statistical properties of each time series used
in  this study and test  for a  stable long-run relationship among financial  structure and
volatility of four financial variables in Korea using Johansen's conintegration technique.
In section IV, we investigate the dynamic impact of financial structure on the volatility of
four  financial  variables  using  the  vector-autoregression  model.  Conclusions  are
presented in section V.
II. The Development of Korea's Financial Structure
This section will investigate the changes in financial structure and the underlying
regulation, tax, and legal changes that caused them.  The most important policy measure
of government-led economic development in Korea was financial policy  (e.g., interest-
rate regulation and policy loans).  The heavy intervention of the Korean government in
the financial system during the 1960s and 1970s is revealed by its discretionary allocation
of  funds  to  target  industries  through  policy  loans  (credit  rationing).  This  caused
misallocation (overinvestment) of financial resources into the heavy manufacturing  anid
chemical industries, which led to creditor bankers' losses.  The banking sector suffered
from a lack of competitiveness, an accumulation of non-performing assets, and delays in
liberalization.  Policy loans  at preferential interest rates accounted for half of the total
credit  offered by domestic  financial institutions  in  1970s and  about 30 percent  in  the
1980s with the expansion of non-bank financial Institutions (NBFIs, hereafter; Bank  of
Korea, 1995).
In the fifth economic development plan ('82-'86),  the Korean government  put
more  emphasis  on  the  stability,  efficiency,  and  social  equity  within  the  economy,
2believing  that  a  massive  misallocation of  resources  in  the  heavy  manufacturing  and
chemical industriezs  could have been avoided if the functioning of the financial system
had been  left  in  the hands  of  the private  sector.  The  government  tried  to  improve
efficiency through  the promotion  of competition  and private  initiative.  The goals  of
financial reform  were  reducing  inefficiency  and  preventing  private  rent-seeking  and
foreign control of the financial market (Amsden and Euh, 1993).
1. Changes in Finaancial  Structure, Size, Activity and Efficiency in Korea
Among financial institutions, banks provide fiunds  mostly through loans and they
dominated in financial institution borrowings until the 1970s.  Their relative importance
has gradually declined, slipping from 29.2 percent of the market in the first half of the
1970s to  19.2 percent in the first half of the  1990s,  Whereas  Table  1 shows that the
market shares of non-banks and securities market inzreased over the period 1970-74 to
1990-94  frorn  8.8  percent  to  33.2  percent  and  from  1.1.1 percent  to  27.0  percent
respectively.  The share  of deposits held by nonbanks increased  from  31.6 percent  in
1980 ito  67.6 percent in 1995 (see Table 2).
Despite the slow pace of reform, Korea's financial market experienced growth in
overall size and activity.  Korean financial depth increased from 49.4 percent in  1981 to
103.2 percent in  1989 and to  150.0 percent in  1995, mostly due to  the growth in the
nonbanking sector.  However, stock market capitaliZation to GDP grew even more over
this period, from 65  percent to 63.4 percent.  This explains the growth in the stock market's
relative size, which started out at 20 percent in early  1980s, but ended the decade at 90
percent.  During the same period, stock market liquidity and bank credit to the private
sector also increased, leading  to an increase  in overall  activity from 44 percent  to  82
3percent of GDP.  However, the growth in stock market liquidity far outweighed that in
bank credit as can be seen from relative activity figures.  Looking at efficiency indicators,
relative efficiency increased whereas  overall efficiency fell during the period.  This  is
because although stock  market turnover increased with  liberalization,  banking spreads
increased even more.
2. Development of  Non-Bank Financial Institutions
In this section, we will analyze the development of non-bank financial institutions
(NBFIs),  their  special  treatment  by  law  and  regulation,  their  structure  and  business
activities,  their  role  in  stimulating  and  mobilizing  savings,  and  their  contribution  to
Korea's economic development
Many NBFIs were introduced in 1972 in response to the Presidential Emergency
Decree  for Economic  Stabilization and Growth.  Their numbers  and volume  of funds
grew significantly during the rapid economic growth of the 1970s and  1980s.  A further
contribution to their rapid growth came from the relatively higher interest rates permitted
to them and the greater degree of autonomy in management they were allowed compared
to  traditional banks.  In  1982, requirements for establishing NBFIs  were reduced  and
consequently twelve short-tern  finance companies  and 57 mutual  savings and finance
companies  began  operations.  During  the  period  1987 to  1990, five  securities  trust
companies  and eighteen  life insurance  companies were  in  operation  (Bank  of Korea,
1995).
NBFIs can be classified into four categories according to their business activities:
i) development institutions, which consist of the Korea Development Bank, the Export-
Import Bank of Korea, and the Korea Long Term Credit Bank; ii) investment instituticns,
which consist of investment and finance companies, merchant banking corporations, and
4securities investment trust companies; iii) savings institutions including trust accounts of
banks,  mutual  savings  and  finance  companies,  credit  unions,  mutual  credit  facilities,
community credit  cooperatives, and postal savings; and iv)  life insurance  institutions.
Out of these four categories of NBFIs, investment and life insurance  institutions grew
most rapidly during the period 1980-1995.  These NBIFIs  have contributed significantly
to  the stimulation and mobilization of savings since they were  able to circumvent the
interest-rate ceilings on both the sources and uses of  iunds (Koo, 1993).  Table 2 shows
that over the period  1]980-1995,  the share of loans made by NBFIs increased from 36.7
percent to 57.  1]  percernt. On the demand side, high real interest rates (due to slowing price
increases  in  the  early  1980s) jeopardized  the  viability  of  firms  with  high  financial
leverage.  Because  of the  repressed  commercial bark  interest  rates,  corporations  not
suppoited by the government were forced to borrow from NBFIs.  NBFIs evaded the low
interest-rate  policy of Ministry of Finance (MOF) by requiring compensating balances
that borrowers  had  to  redeposit  in  the  same financial  institution, thereby  raising  the
effective interest rates on the original loans (Bank of Korea, 1995).
3. A Measure of Financial Structure
The measurement of financial structure in this study draws heavily on the recent
work  by  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Levine  (1999)  that  derived  several  findings  on  the
relationship between financial structure and per capita income level.  According to their
study, in  higher income countries, banks and other financial intermediaries as well as
stock markets and the overall financial system tend to be larger, more active, and more
efficient. In higher income countries insurance companies, pension funds, and other non-
bank financial intermediaries are larger as a share of GDP.
5For practical purposes, we used three variables as indicators of Korea's financial
structure: bank assets to GDP (claims on the private sector by commercial banks to GDP,
BANK);  non-banking financial institution's  assets to  GDP as  a measurement of other
financial institution's  size (NBFI); and stock-market capitalization to GDP as a measure
of stock market  development (MK).  Variable definitions  are given in  the Appendix.
Figure  1 shows the changing pattern  of the financial  structure in  Korea and  Figure  2
shows the volatility of four financial variables.
III.  The Data and Their Statistical Properties
In this section we define the variables used in this study and test the stationarity of
those variables using two different unit root test procedures.
1. The Data and Their Statistical Properties
All  quarterly  data are from the March  1999 issue  of the IMF's  International
Financial Statistics,  CD-Rom  version,  and  are seasonally  adjusted  using  exponential
smoothing.  Data definitions are found in the Appendix.  A control variable is used to
isolate the effects of structural variables (that are expected to maintain their impact over
the long run) from the short-run effects of policy -- monetary or fiscal -- on the volatility
of each  economic variable a la Krumm  (1993).  Volatility responds to  both  real  anid
monetary  variables.  Monetary  and  fiscal  variables  are  combined  into  one
macroeconomic control  variable,  VV,  which  is  defined  as  the percentage  change  in
domestic credit over and above the percentage change in GDP, foreign prices, and t]he
nominal exchange rate.
VV =  DC*  - Y* - Pf* - NE*,  (1)
6where DC is domestic credit, Y is GDP, Pf is U.S. WPI, NE;  is the nominal exchange rate
to the U.S. dollar, and * indicates percentage change.
In order to examine the stationarity of each time  series, we conducted unit root
tests.  Table 3 reports the results from the Augmented Dic]key-Fuller and Paco Goerlich
Tests, which reveal that all series have unit roots.
2. Johansen's Coireation  Test
Since all variables are non-stationary, we use Johansen's co-integration analysis to
test whether those variables have co-integrating vectors.  Johansen (1988) and Johansen
and Juselius (1990) cleveloped a cointegration test methodology that overcome most of
the problems of the previous two-step approach.
Johansen and Juselius (1990) considered the following general model:
Xt  =  IIXtt-  +...+Ht-Ik  Xt-k +V+Et  fort=l,....T,  (2)
where  X t is a vector of variables ; £, I.......  E T  are independent and normal errors with zero
mean  and  covarianct  matrix  1;  X  t-k, X  o  are  fixed;  and  v  is  an  intercept  vector.
Economic timne  series  are often non-stationary  and systenms  such as the above vector-
autoregressive representation  (VAR) can be written in the conventional first-difference
form:
AXt  =  Fki AX  t-k-1  +  I  Xt-k + V + £t  (3)
where r  =  i  l  --  -I  - rI  2-  ................ F  - .lk)  for  i=1,'2  .......  k- 1,
and  I  =  --  rI .................  - IH-k).
The orly  level term in equation  (3) is FIX  t-k.  Thus, only the Fl matrix contains
information  about the long-run  relationship between  the variables  in the  data vector.
There are three possible cases:
71. If the rI matrix has rank zero then all variables in X are integrated of order one  or
higher and the VAR has no long-run properties;
2. If the Fl matrix has rank p (i.e., it is of full rank ), the variables in X are stationary; and
3. If rI matrix  has rank r  ( 0  < r < p), El can be  decomposed  into two  distinct  (p*r)
matrices a  and 13  such that 11  = af'.
The third case implies that there are r cointegrating vectors.  The parameters of
the cointegrating vectors are contained in the ,B  matrix.  Therefore  1'X is stationary even
though  Xt  itself  is  nonstationary.  The a matrix  gives  weights  with  which  the
cointegrating vectors  enter each equation  of the system.  To  determine the number  of
cointegrating vectors,  r, Johansen  and Juselius  (1990) used  two likelihood-ratio  tests.
The first test is based on the maximal eigenvalue (XMAX) -- the null hypothesis is that
there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative r+l  cointegrating vectors.
The  second  test  is based  on the  trace  of  the  stochastic  matrix  (TRACE)  --  the null
hypothesis  is  that  there  are  at  most  r  cointegrating  vectors  against  the  alternative
hypothesis that there are r or more cointegrating vectors.  Two likelihood-ratio tests for
the existence and cointegrating vectors are reported in Table 5.  Johansen's  cointegralion
tests are implemented using four lags and for four sets of five variables which include the
volatility, financial structure, and control variables.
Table 5-A shows that the volatility of stock prices has two cointegrating vecitors
with the financial structural variables at the 10 percent critical level based on both Xinax
and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vectors can be written as follows:
-.058 VSTK  - 1.644 NBFI + 12.22 BANK + .662 MK + 0.018 VV  = 0  (6)
8Equation (6) implies that increases in bank assets to GDP and stock market capitalization
to  GDP increases the volatility of the stock price.  This  finding is consistent with the
impulse response analysis of the vector-autoregression model. The economic implication
of this  cointegrating vector is that  increase in bank  assets (BANK)  and  stock market
capitalization (MK) destabilize the volatility of stock prices, implying a high sensitivity
of stock prices to financial activities of the economy.  The impulse response function in
Figure 3 confirms this finding.
Table 5-B shows that the volatility of the real effective exchange rate has three
cointegrating vectors with the financial structure variables at the 10 percent critical level
based on both  Xmax and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vector scan be written
as follows:
.024 VREX + 2052  NBFI  - 13.05 BANK  -.723 MK + 0.151 VV = 0  (7).
This cointegrating vector is consistent with the impulse response analysis of the vector-
autoregression model presented in Figures 4-A and 4-B.
Tabl]e 5-C  shows  that  the  volatility  of money-market  interest  rates  has  three
cointegrating vectors with the financial structural variables at the 10 percent critical level
based on both  %ima;x  and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vectors can be written
as follows:
-1.138 VMMR  + 4.504 NBFI  - 25.846 BANK-1.285  MK + 0.654 VV =0.  (8)
This implies that increases in non-bank financial institutions' assets to GDP increase the
volatility of the bond  yield, whereas  increases in  stock market  capitalization to  GDP
decrease the volatility of money-market rates.  This finding is consistent with the impulse
response analysis of the vector-autoregression model shown in Figures 5-A and 5-C. The
economic  implication  of  this  cointegrating  vector  is  that  increases  in  stock  market
9capitalization to GDP and non-bank financial institutions' assets destabilize the volatility
of the money-market rate because their activities are less regulated than other financial
sector.
Table  5-D  shows  that  the  volatility  of  government  bond  yield  has  two
cointegrating vectors with the financial structural variables at the 10 percent critical level
based on both  Xmax and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vectors can be written
as follows:
-.226 VBOND + 2.543 NBFI  - 16.78 BANK  -.925 MK + 0.188 VV = 0.  (8)
This implies that increases in bank assets to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP
decrease the volatility of the government bond yield. This finding is consistent with the
impulse  response  analysis  of  the  vector-autoregression  model  which  is  presented  in
Figure 6.  The economic implication of this cointegrating vector is that while increases in
bank asset and stock market capitalization stabilize the volatility of the government bond
yield, increases in non-bank financial institutions' assets destabilize the volatility of the
government bond yields because their activities are less regulated.
IV. Dynamic Analysis Using a Vector-Autoregression Model
In this  section we use the vector-autoregression model to examine the dynamic
impact of financial structure on the volatility of the financial variables.
1. A Vector-Autoregression Model
We will test the dynamic impact of changing financial structure on the volatility of four
economic variables  using  the  vector-autoregressive  model  presented  in  equations  (9)
through (13):
VRX = I  oL MK  +  I  oq  BANK  +  I  %- NBFI  +  Icx% VV  (9)
10MK  =  I  VRX  +  £oci  BANK  +  £oq  NBFI  +  Y.i  VV  (10)
BANK=  axj MK +  YX.  VRX  +  Ic4  NBFI  +  X.0% VV  (11)
NBFI  =  od  MK  +  £ou  BANK  +  Icx  VRX  +  £ou,  VV  (12)
WV=  £oci MK  +  £ocu  BANK  +  £cx  NBF1  +  Ea  %.  VRX,  (13)
where  VRX is the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, MK is the amount of
stock market capitalization divided by GDP, BANKC  is claims on the private  sector by
commercial banks, NBFI is the ratio of bank to non-bank  financial institutions'  assets,
and  W  is  the  macroeconomic policy  stance  variable to  control  for  the  impact  of
macroeconojmic policies.
2. Impulse Response Function
The  goal  of  this  section  is  to  investigate  the  dynamic  impact  of  financial
structural variables  on the volatility of economic variab]Les.  Granger-causality amongst
these variables  is examined and  the results are reported in  Table  4.  Based  on these
causality  tests  and  economic  theory,  the  ordering  of  the  variables  in  the  vector-
autoregression is determined. Various different orderings are tried to see the robustness
of the test result.
The  dynamic  impact  of  financial  structure  and  macroeconomic  policy  stance
variables are analyzed through the computation of variance decompositions (VDCs) and
impulse  response  functions  (IRFs)  which,  in  turn,  are based  on  the  moving-average
representation  of  the  VAR  model  and  reflect  bcth  direct  and  indirect  effects.  In
particular, the VDCs for VREX indicate the percenlage of the forecast-error variance in
the VREX accounted by t]he  financial structure and V'V.
113. Dynamic  Impact of Financial  Structure  on Economic  Volatility
An optimal  lag of four is chosen  based on the likelihood-ratio  test and the model
is then estimated. Since different  orderings  of the variables  in the VAR estimation  yield
different  results,  various orderings  based on the Granger-causality  tests reported  in Table
4 were tried.  However, different orderings  did not bring about significant differences.
From the  impulse response function and  variance decomposition of  forecast-error
variances,  we find the following:
Volatility  of the stock  price
hnpulse response functions show that stock market capitalization (MK) and
private claims of commercial  banks (BANK)  increase  the volatility  of the stock prices in
Korea.  Increased  stock  market capitalization  increases  the uncertainty  of the market and
leads to  the increased volatility of  stock prices -- this  reflects the  highly volatile
characteristics  of the stock price independent of the financial structure.  Finally, the
macroeconomic  policy stance variable has a negative impact on VSTK  The impulse
response  functions  are shown  in Figures  3-A to 3-C.
Table 6-A shows the innovation  accountings  of the volatility of the stock price.
With the exception the  stock price volatility variable itself, BANK plays the mnost
important  role in explaining  the variance decomposition  of the forecast  error variance  of
the volatility  of the stock  price, explaining  about 12.percent  of the 12-step  ahead forecast
error variance.  The stock market capitalization to  GDP  (MK) variable is next in
importance.  However, the policy stance (VV) and stock market capitalization (MIK)
variables explain very little of the forecast-error  variance of the volatility of the stock
12price volatility.  I'able  6-C shows the variance decompiosition of the volatility of the
stock price from one to 48 quarters.
Volatility of real effective exchange rate
The  impulse  response  function  shows  thal. stock  market  capitalization  (MK)
increases the volatility  of the real  effective exchange rate,  whereas  private  claims  of
commercial banks  to  GDP  (BANK) destabilize  the volatility  in  Korea.  This  can be
explained by the strong restrictions on the foreigners'investments  in Korea's stock market
and  on  most  capital  flows, which  are  one  of  the most  important  variables  affecting
exchange-rate movements.  Impulse response functions are shown in Figures 4-A to 4-C.
In  sum, wit;h the  exception  of  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  itself,  stock  market
capitalization to  GIDP plays  the most  important  role in  explaining  the  forecast  error
variance of the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, explaining about 12 percent
of  the  forecast  error  variance  by  8 quarters.  The  next  most  important  explanatory
variable is private claims of the banking sector (BANK), explaining about 7 percent by 8
quarters.  IHowever, the  policy  stance  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  (NBFI)
variables  explaini very little  of the forecast-error variance  of the volatility  of the real
effective exchange rate.  Table 6-B shows the varianrce  decomposition of the volatility of
the real effective exchange rate in Korea.
Volatility of the money market rate (VMMR)
inpulse  response functions are shown in Figures 5-A to 5-C.  These indicate that
the stock market capitalization to GDP (MK) increases the volatility of the money-market
13rate, while private claims  of commercial banks  (BANK) decrease the volatility  of the
money-market rate. This  implies that as a country moves  from a bank-based  financial
structure to  a market-based financial structure, the volatility  of the money-market  rate
increases.  From  the  variance  decomposition  of  the  forecast  error  variance  of  the
volatility  of the money-market rate,  except volatility  of the money market  rate  itself,
stock  market  capitalization  is  playing  the  most  important  role,  explaining  some  22
percent of the forecast error variance in 24 quarters ahead (commercial banks claims on
private  sector to GDP  (BANK) is the next most  important variable).  Both the policy
stance variable (VV) and NBFI have very small roles to play in explaining the forecast-
error variance of the volatility of the stock price volatility.  Table 6-C shows the variance
decomposition of the volatility of the money-market rate from one to 24 quarters.
Volatility of the Government Bond Yield on Housing
Both  the  stock  market  capitalization  to  GDP  (MK)  and  private  claims  of
commercial bank to GDP (BANK) decrease the volatility of the government bond yield
on housing.  This can be explained by the strong commitment of the Korean government
to supplying stable funds for new housing construction.  However,  an increase  in the
macroeconomic policy  stance variable (VV) causes an increase  in the volatility of t]he
government bond yield.  This finding is consistent with economic theory.  The impulse
response function of BOND is shown in Figures 6-A,  to 6-C.
When  we  move  to  the  relative  importance  of  financial  structure  on  the
forecasting-error variance of the bond yield volatility, claims of the commercial bank:  to
the private sector (BANK) plays the most important role and stock market capitalization
14to  GDP  (MK)  is  plays  the next  most  important role.  Innovation  accounting of  the
government bond yield on housing is given in Table 6-D.
V. Conclusionis
This  study tried  to  identify the  role of  financial structure  on the  volatility  of
economic variables, the real effective exchange rate, the money-market rate, government
bond  yield, and  stock  price.  We  used the  concept  of  market-based  and bank-based
financial structure developed by  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine  (1999) to  investigate the
changing role of financial structure on the volatility of the economic variables.  From
this case study of Korea, it is difficult to say that our findings are unique.  However, some
of our more interesting findings, at least for Korea, are summrarized  in what follows.
It  seerns that  there  exist more  than  one  long-run  stable  relationship  between
financial structure and economic variables which are volatility of real effective exchange
rate, money market rate, stock price, and government boncl yields on housing in Korea.
We also found that the dynamic impact of financial structure on the volatility of each
economic  variable  is  asymmetric, i.e.,  some  economnic  variable's  volatility  increased
whereas other variable's  volatility  decreased.  For the stock  price volatility, increased
claims to private sector by commercial bank to GDP and stock market capitalization to
GDP both  increase  the volatility of  the stock price.  This  reflects  the highly  volatile
nature of stock prices, which is independent of Korea's financial structure.
For the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, claims to private sector by
commercial bank to GDP (BANK) increases volatilii:y and government  should monitor
closely  the  comrnercial  bank's  activity  in  foreign  exchange  market  to  avoid  their
excessive  risk  exposure  and  destabilizing  speculations.  However,  stock  market
15capitalization  to GDP (MK) decreases  the volatility  of the real effective  exchange rates
implying  that as Korea's financial  structure  moves from a bank-based  to a market-based
system,  the volatility  of the real effective  exchange  rate decreased since mid-1980s  even
with a more  flexible  exchange  rate system  and this is confirmed  by Figure 2.
Since the exchange  rate is determined  (at least in the short run) by capital  inflows
and outflows in the foreign-exchange  market, this finding reflects the restrictions on
foreigners'  ownership of domestic stock in Korea during the analysis period and the iact
that most of the capital  flows are channeled  through  commercial  banks.
For the volatility  of the money-market  interest rate, stock market capitalization  to
GDP (MK) increases the volatility whereas increased claims to the private sector of
commercial  banks to GDP (BANK)  decreases the volatility of the money-market  rate.
This implies that if interest targeting is the primary goal of policy authority, strong
supervision  and monitoring is necessary in the stock market to  stabilize the money-
market rate.  For the volatility  of the government  bond yield, both the claims to private
sector by commercial  bank to GDP (BANK) and stock market capitalization to GDP
(MK)  decrease  the volatility  of the yield on government  bond on housing. This explains
the intrinsic stability of the yield on govermment  bond yield on housing.  The Korean
government's  policy goal of stabilizing the house supply in  Korea has successfllly
isolated  the housing  market from the impact  of financial  structure.
This study identified  a stable long-run  relation  ship between  financial  structure  and
volatility  of each financial  variable in Korea, implying  that stabilization  policy should  be
different  depending  on priority of the policy goals. Future study will investigate  whether
the findings of this study are robust with respect to different definitions of financial
structure  and for different  data sets,  i.e., cross-country  data.
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18Data Appendix:  Sources and Definitions
1. RX: real effective exchange rate of Korean won from J]P  Morgan.
2. BOND: government bond yield on housing  (IFS line 61).
3. STK: stock price index (IFS line 62).
4. MMR: money-market rate (IFS line 60b).
5. VRX: volatility of real effective exchange rate defined as a six-month window
standard deviation for each quarter; data are from JP' Morgan.
6. VBOND: volatility of the government bond yield on housing defined as a six-month
window standard deviation for each quarter (IFS line 61).
7. VSTK: volatility of the stock price defined as a six-month window standard deviation
for each quarter (IFS line 62).
8. VMMR: volatility of the money-market rate defined as a six-month window standard
deviation for each quarter (IFS line 60b).
9. NBFI: Olher financial institutions' domestic assets (IFS lines 42a-d) to GDP (IFS line
9O  bp).
10. iBANK:  Commercial banks' domestic assets (IFS lines 22 a-d) to GDP (IFS line 90
bp).
11. MK: Stock market capitalization (Monthly Bulletin of the Stock Market) to GDP (IFS
line 90 bp).
12. VV: Macroeconomic Control Variable defined in the text.
19Table 1. Financial Market Composition of Korea*
1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94
(1)Financial  38.0  40.7  45.6  48.7  52.5
Institutions  _
Banks  29.2  26.2  23.2  20.3  19.2
Non-Banks  8.8  14.5  22.4  28.4  3:3.2
(2)Security Market  11.1  15.6  20.0  27.1  2 7.0
Stocks  9.7  11.1  11.9  16.4  1:1.4
Bonds  1.3  4.5  8.1  10.7  15.6
(3) CP Market  0.5  1.4  3.2  4.7  4.0
(4) Foreign Market  13.6  13.3  6.0  0.2  2.2
(5) Other Finance  36.9  29.0  25.2  19.3  14.4
Total  100  100  100  100  100
Notes: * denotes the non-financial sector's fund raising
CP denotes commercial paper
Source:  The Financial System in Korea (1995), Bank of Korea.
20Table 2.  IMarket Share of Financial Institulions iin  Korea
Loans (in percent)  Deposits (in percent)
1980  11985  11990  1995*  1980  11985  1990  1995*
Dep. Money  Bank** 63.3  58.4  48.3  42.9  68.4  53.5  41.0  32.4
-32.2%  -52.6%
BIs***  36.7  41.6  51.7  57.1  31.6  '146.5  59.0  67.6
55.6%  113.9%
A.Development  14.8  10.8  18.3  8.0  3.8  4.1  3.1  4.2
-45.9%  10.5%
B.Savings  13.0  16.3  25.3  33.3  13.5  |15.5  127.1  136.5
152.6%  170%
C.Investment  5.8  7.6  8.1  6.8  9.5  15.8  16.2  15.5
17.2%  63%
D.LifeInsurance Co.  3.1  6.9  10.0  9.0  4.8  11.1  12.6  11.4
190.3%  137.5%
Notes: 1)* dlenotes  the amount by the end of June, 1995
2)** denotes money deposits at banks
3)**:1  denotes Non-banking Financial Institutions
4)% denotes the total growth rate between June 1980 and June 1995
Source:  The Financial System in Korea (1995), Bank of Korea.
21Table 3.  Tests of Unit Roots
A. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable  La2s  ADF&  ADF7  Joint test of unit root and no constant
VRX  2 (1)  -2.29  -10.7  4.0
VSTK  I (1)  -2.20  -9.16  2.45
VBOND  13 (1)  -2.84  -8.2  4.07
VMMR  2 (1L  -2.87  -6.8  4.12
NBVB  O(0)  1.15  0.82  3.27
BANK  141  -0.63  -0.87  2.29  _
MK  1 (8)  -1.25  -3.07  1.23
Note: ** denotes that the estimate is significant at 5 percent critical level.
B.  Paco Goerlich Test
Variable  AR  r......  t T-i  Constant  No constant,  Conclusion
VRX  4  -1.29  -1.07  -1.12  Unit root. no drift
VSTK  4  -1.61  -1.73  -0.75  Unit root. no drift
VBOND  4  -2.90  -2.54  -1.09  Unit root. no drift
VMMR  4  -2.50  2.3  .70  Unit root. no drifti-
NBVB  4  -2.66  -0.12  N.A.  Unit root. drift
BANK  4  -1.79  -1.03  1.61  Unit root. no drift
NK  4  -A1.98  2.19  1.29  Unit root no drift
Note: ** denotes that the estimate is significant at 5 percent critical level.
22Table  4. Gianger-Causality  Test
A. Volatilitv  of Stock Price
V  VSTK  NBFI  BANK.  MK  yy
VST  .00o0±**  .38  .29  .67  .67
NBFI  _  0  .07  .000**  .04**_  .217  .520
BAN  .7.011  **  000*  .057  .042**
MK  _  .009**  .000**_  490  _
VV  YŽLfi_-  .057  .063  9  250  .059
Notes:  Figures  are significance  probabilities.  ** denotes  significant  at 5 percent.
B. Volatility  of Real Effective  Exchange  Rate
_I_REX  NBFI  I BA  MK  1yy  I
VREX=_  000**  .14  .29  .25  .90
NBFI __65  .000**  . _  .006**  .035**
BANK:  .018  . .000**  .000**  .014**
LMK__  . 3  .. 00*  .. 7  .0**  .35
WY  _-69  .23  .019**  13023**
Notes:  Figures  are significance  probabilities.  ** denotes  significant  at 5 percent.
C._Volatility  of Money-Market  Rate
I_-  2  MMRt  NBEI.  NANNBFI  MK  Wy
Im  :,  VM00]*  .43  .08  _  .98  .29
NBI  _921  .00.2_.-.12  .13
BANK  77  . .0002*_.  .0007**  .034**
MK  _  58  .000**  _.26
W  _-  78  .22  .06.63  .18
Notes.-  Figures are significance  probabilities.  ** denotes  significant  at 5 percent.
D. Volatili:of  Government  Bond Yield
_ VBOND  NBFI  BANK  MK  yV
VBO[D  .000**  .190  .06  .160  620
NBFI ___230  .000**  .269  _  435  .268
BANK;  _  .293  .002**  .. 006**  .044**
MK  _-  710  .000**  .80  .000**  .390.
W  _-  .200  .210  _.066  1_960  .030**
Notes: Figures are significance probabilities.  '*  denotes significant at 5 percent.
23Table  5. Johansen's  Cointegration  Test
A. Endogenous  Series:  VSTP. NBFI,  BANK,  MK. W
Lags in the model:  4, No. of observations=65,  No. of observations  - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value  L-max  Trace  HO:  r  p-r  L-max90  Trace9O
0.8912  144.19**  208.74**  0  5  18.965
0.491l9  44.01 **  64.55**  1  4  15.00  36.58  _
0.2106  15.37**  20.54  2  3  11.23215  _
0.0750  5.07  5.16  3  2  7.37  10.35  _
0.0014  0.09  0.09  4  1  2.98  2.98  _
Notes: ** denotes  significant  at 10  percent.
Cointegrating  Vector:
VSTP  NBFI  BANK  MK  VW
-.058  -1.644  12.225  0.662  0.018
-0.7 6  =  -2.739  0  19.046  _0.789  0.089_
B. Endogenous  Series:  VREX.  NBFI.  BANK.  MK. W
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations=65,  No. of observations  - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value  L-max  Trace  HO:  r  p-r  L-max90  Trace90
0.884  138-03**  212.02**  0  5  18.96  5
0.47 6  41.59**  73.99**  1  4  15.00  3.  _
0.3126  24.37**  32.40**  2  3  1.3  21.58  _
0.1049  7.20  8.03  3  2  7.37  10.35  _
0.0127  0.83  0.83  4  1  2.98  2.98  _
Notes: ** denotes  significant  at 10 percent.
Cointegrating  Vector:
VREX  NBFI  BANK  MK  _7
0.024  2.052  -13.05  -0.723  0.151
0.496  5.429  -27.166  -1.250  -0.594  _2
24Table 5. JoRhansen's  Cointegration Test (continued)
C. Endogenous Series: VMMR. NBFI. BANK  MK. W
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations = 65, No. of observations - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value  L-max  Trace  HO:  r  p-r  L-max9O  Trace90
0.8643  - 12&,85**  184.80**  O  5  _18.96  ..- 55.54
0.3376  _  i8*  54.95**  1  4  _15.00  36.58
0.2835  _j1  28.17**  2  3._  11.23  21.8
0.0761  _il6.51  3  2  _7,37  10.35
0.0207  _  1-3  1.36  I  2.98  2.98
Notes: ** denotes significant at 5 percent.
Cointegrating Vector:
VMMR  NBFI  | BANK  K  VV
-1.138  4,k.504  -25.846  L285  0.654
1.934  -7.68  44.483  _  .L50.492
D. Endogenous Series: VBOND. NBFI. BANK  MK. W
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations = 65, No. of observations - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value  L-mrax  Trace  HO:  r  p-r  L-max90  Trace9O
0.8864  - LLA1.36**  202.38**  O  5  _18.96  55.54-
0,323 1  -2537**  61.2*  1  4  _15.00  36.58  -
0.629682_  _L;9*  35.65**  2  3W_11.23  21.58
0.1672  - 'L.9**  -12.7-6**  3  2  _7.37  J0.35
0.0132  - (L_7  0.87  4  1  2.98  2.98
Notes: ** denotes significant at 10 percent.
Cointegrating Vector:
VBOND  NBFI  BANK  MK  W
-.226  _ _,.543  -16.788  _-  '925  .188
.683  _ - 1.287  9.604  -0-655  02895
25Table 6: Variance  Decomposition  of the VAR  Model:
A. Decomposition  of Volatility  of Stock  Price (VSTK)
Percentage  of the forecast-error  variance of VSTK explained  by
quarters  VSTK  NBFI  BANK  MK  VV
4  92.74  1.72  3.33  1.56  0.62_
8  78.57L  3.43  11.37  6.04  0.57
1  2  7738  3.52  11.83  6.70  0.54_
1  6  76.84  3.52  12.23  6.81  0.58  _
20  76.59  3.56  12.05  7.15  0.64_
24  76.37  3.65  11.99  7.32  0.65_
B. Decomposition  of Volatility  of Real Effective  Exchange  Rate (VREX)
Percentage  of the forecast-error  variance  of VREX  explained  by
quarters  VREX  NBFI  BANK  MK  VV
4  90.05  0.08  2.73  6.21  0.92  _
8  80.23  _  0.29  6.80  _  11.57  108  _
12  79.81  0.30  6.56  11.91  1.40  _
16  7961  0.32  6.60  11.98  1.48_
20  79.24  0.35  6.72  12.19  1.48  _
24  7916  0.36  6.71  L  1227  1.48  _
26Table  6: Vairiarnce  Decomposition  of the VAR Model  (continued)
C. Decopsition  of Volatility  of Money-Market  Rate  (MMR)
Percentage  of the forecast-error  variance  of'  MMR explained  by
quarters  MMR  NBFI  BANK  MK  VV
4  8_  1il)  0.07  13.76  _  0.04  1.01
8  __  AL  0.19  17.67  _-1.53  4.09
12  6  9'5  0Q45  _  15.91  _  9.91  3.95
16  __  - 6:  0.55  14.43  17.82  3.58
.20  _60,3  3  0.57  1.5  _21.33  3.45
24  59_ 2  _  0.60  34_  2760
D. Decomnposition  of Volatility  of Government  Bond Yield (BOND)
Percentage  of the forecast-error  variar.ce  of BOND  explained  by
quarters  BOND  NBFI  BANK  MK  VW
4  __4  0.45  14.31  0.79  2.39
8  __L84  0.94  20.39  6.52  3.28
126  _  - 4  _  10.7  22.26  6.96_
16  64Li  1.10  22.21  9.09  3.12
20QI  61.01  1.04  20.97  14.01  2.95
24  - 10_  1.04  2039  _  17.67  2.82
27Figure  1. Financial  Structure  of
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